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THE CURRENT STATE OF EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES IN LOUISIANA
Robert Force*
Kerry J. Triche**

INTRODUCTION

The recently enacted Louisiana Code of Evidence represents a new
approach to evidence law in Louisiana in at least one critical respect:
it brings together all of the major rules of evidence within a single
comprehensive and coherent system. The Code, however, is silent on
the subject of evidentiary privileges. The Louisiana State Law Institute
is currently working to fill this gap. In the interim, Louisiana lawyers
must continue to use the existing evidentiary privileges, both those that
are scattered throughout the Revised Statutes and those that have been
created by the courts.
The purpose of this article is to review the current state of evidentiary
privileges in Louisiana. Presently, Louisiana recognizes seven general
privileges' as well as a number of narrow statutory privileges, most of
which are cast in terms of specific requirements of confidentiality. 2 No
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1. The seven major privileges in Louisiana are: I) Attorney-client, civil cases, La.
R.S. 13:3734.3 (Supp. 1988), criminal cases, La. R.S. 15:475 (1981); 2) Husband-wife,
criminal cases, La. R.S. 15:461 (1981); 3) Physician-patient, civil cases, La. R.S. 13:3734
(Supp. 1988), criminal cases, 15:476 (1981); 4) Priest-penitent, civil cases, La. R.S. 13:3734.1
(Supp. 1988), criminal cases, La. R.S. 15:477 (1981); 5) Informant, see State v. Dotson,
256 So. 2d 594 (La. 1971); 6) Journalist, La. R.S. 45:1451-55 (1982 & Supp. 1988); and,
7) Psychologist, La. R.S. 37:2363 (1988).
2. Accountant, La. R.S. 37:87 (1988); Adoption records, La. R.S. 9:437 (1965 &
Supp. 1988); AIDS testing, La. R.S. 40:1299.40(D)(2); Anatomical gift, La. R.S. 17:2352(D)
(1982); Attorney general's investigation; suits against state employees, 13:5108.1(E) (Supp.
1988); Commercial feed sellers, business practices, La. R.S. 3:1901(c)(5) (1987); Commodity
dealers, La. R.S. 3:3421 (1987); Community shelter records, La. R.S. 46:2124.1; Counselor,
La. R.S. 37:1114 (1988); Crawfish research report, La. R.S. 3:556.10 (1987); Crimestoppers
organizations, La. R.S. 15:477.1 (Supp. 1988); Dairy industry information, La. R.S.
3:577.12 (1987); Drug tests and reportsp students, La. R.S. 14:403.1 (1986); Employment
records, La. R.S. 23:1660 (1985); Ethics board proceedings, La. R.S. 42:1141(12) (Supp.
1988); Fertilizer manufacture reports, La. R.S. 3:1367; Fertilizer sales, La. R.S.
3:1314(C)(2)(c); Financial Institutions Office, records, La. R.S. 6:103 (1986 & Supp. 1988);
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attempt will be made here to catalogue all of these special provisions,
or even all of the general privileges. Instead, this article deals only with
the three most important general privileges: husband-wife, physicianpatient, and attorney-client. 3 Although some evidentiary rules, such as
the rule of waiver, cut across all privileges, the approach used in this
article will be to discuss each privilege separately. Furthermore, for
purposes of clarity the evidentiary privileges for civil cases and criminal
cases will be discussed separately.
THE SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE (HUSBAND-WIFE PRIVILEGE)

Civil Cases
Apparently Louisiana does not presently afford spouses a privilege
in civil cases, even when the evidence at issue concerns their "private
conversations." Prior to 1950, Louisiana did have a privilege that covered
such private conversations. 4 When the legislature enacted the Revised
Statutes in that year, however, it neglected to include a spousal privilege
for civil cases. It is not clear whether the omission was intentional.' At
any rate, the legislature thus far has made no effort to reinstitute a
spousal privilege for civil cases.
Criminal Cases
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:461 sets forth the rules governing the
spousal privilege in criminal cases. 6 This spousal privilege applies only

Foreign banks, La. R.S. 6:567 (1986); Foster parents, records of investigation, La. R.S.
46:284 (1982); Insurance agent termination, report to commissioner, La. R.S. 22:1120(B)
(1978); Interpreters, La. R.S. 46:2371 (1982); Judicial commitment, report, La. R.S.
28:56(A) (Supp. 1988); Judiciary commission records, La. R.S. 44:10 (1982); Livestock
crimestoppers, La. R.S. 3:750(F) (1987); Matrimonial rights or status, civil case, La. R.S.
13:3734.2 (Supp. 1988); Mediator, La. R.S. 9:354-55 (Supp. 1988); Medical peer review
committee records, La. R.S. 13:3715.3 (1988); Pesticides formula, La. R.S. 3:3221 (1987);
Presentence, pre-parole, clemency investigative report, La. R.S. 15:574.12 (Supp. 1988);
Public employee personnel records, La. R.S. 44:11 (Supp. 1988); School employee assessment report, La. R.S. 17:391.5(E) (1982); Social worker, La. R.S. 37:2714 (1988); Tax
records, La. R.S. 47:1508 (Supp. 1988); Trade secrets, La. R.S. 51:1435 (1987).
3. This is not to suggest that the other four general privileges may not be important
in particular cases. However, because there is little jurisprudence relating to these four
privileges, a discussion of these privileges probably would not be helpful.
4. 1916 La. Acts No. 157, § I provided in part: "[T]he competent witness in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, in court, or before a person having authority to receive
evidence, shall be a person of proper understanding, but: First. Private conversations
between husband and wife shall be privileged ..
"
5. See Note, Evidence-The Husband-Wife Testimony Privilege, 14 La. L. Rev. 427
(1954), reprinted in G. Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law 173 (1974).
6. La. R.S. 15:461 (1981) provides in part:
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when a man and a woman are legally married; it therefore does not
apply to concubines or so called common-law spouses. 7 Furthermore,
like all evidentiary privileges, this privilege may be waived.' As a general
proposition a defendant's failure to assert the privilege by way of objecting to the testimony of his spouse constitutes a waiver of the privilege. 9
However, by failing to object to the mere calling of the spouse, the
defendant does not waive his right to object to that spouse's testimony
regarding private conversations. 10
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:461 contains two privileges, a defendant's privilege and a witness's privilege. The first is found in section
461(1). Under that section, a defendant in a criminal case has the privilege
of excluding testimony regarding private communications that the defendant and the defendant's spouse shared during the course of their
marriage. Thus, the defendant may object only to testimony about private
conversations; he may not object to testimony about other matters
between them during the course of the marriage." The term "private
conversations" in this context refers to oral communications only and
does not include letters or notes sent between the spouses. 2 Further, in
order to be within the scope of the privilege, the conversation must
have been made under circumstances in which other persons were not
present or could not have been expected to hear what was said. Conversations that are conducted in the presence of third persons or in
crowded public places and that can therefore be easily overheard are

The competent witness in any criminal proceeding, in court or before a person
having authority to receive evidence, shall be a person of proper understanding,
but:
(1) Private conversations between husband and wife shall be privileged.
(2) Neither husband nor wife shall be compelled to be a witness on
any trial upon an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding,
against the other....
7. State v. Kaufman, 331 So. 2d 16 (La.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 981, 97 S. Ct.
495 (1976), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 La. L. Rev. 575, 594 (1977), reprinted in G. Pugh,
Louisiana Evidence Law 214 (Supp. 1978).
8. See generally La. R.S. 15:478 (1981).
9. See generally La. Code Evid. art. 103 and La. Code Crim. P. art. 841 for the
need for a timely objection in order to raise an evidentiary error on appeal. See also
State v. Adams, 394 So. 2d 1204 (La. 1981); State v. Bennett, 357 So. 2d 1136 (La.
1978), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts, 19771978 Term-Evidence, 39 La. L. Rev. 955, 978 (1979).
10. State v. Smith, 489 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
11. Adams, 394 So. 2d 1204. The literal language of Revised Statutes 15:461(1) refers
to all "private conversations" between spouses, not only those between a defendant and
spouse.
12. State v. Morgan, 147 La. 205, 84 So. 589 (1920); State v. Fuller, 454 So. 2d
119 (La. 1984); State v. Strong, 463 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 466
So. 2d 1300 (1985).
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not private.' 3 However, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
communications between spouses are presumed to be private.

4

In order

to rebut this presumption of confidentiality, the state may introduce
evidence showing the presence of a third person. In such situations, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the conversation was
in fact private.' 5
This privilege appears to admit of no clear-cut exceptions. For
example, there is no exception to this privilege when the spouse is a
victim of a crime of violence committed by the defendant-spouse. Although dictum in an older Louisiana case suggested that there are strong
reasons for creating such an exception, apparently no court has taken
up this suggestion.' 6 There does appear, however, to be a statutory
exception to the rule regarding confidential communications contained
in Revised Statutes 14:403(F), which provides for a suspension of the
privilege in any proceeding concerning the abuse of a child.' 7 A Louisiana

appellate court considered this provision in State v. Smith' s but failed
to resolve the question whether this statute created an exception to the
section 461(1) privilege.' 9
The second spousal privilege, the witness's privilege, is provided for
in Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:461(2). Under this section, a witness
who is called to testify against his spouse may refuse to do so. This
privilege resides in the witness himself; hence, only the witness may

waive it. So, for example, if a spouse-witness voluntarily agrees to testify

13. State v. Landry, 502 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 508 So. 2d 63
(1987); State v. Narcisse, 426 So. 2d 118 (La.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S. Ct.
202 (1983).
14. State v. Webb, 156 La. 952, 101 So. 338 (1924); Narcisse, 426 So. 2d 118.
15. See Narcisse, 426 So. 2d 118; State v. Dupuy, 319 So. 2d 194 (La. 1975), discussed
in Pugh & McClelland, supra note 7, reprinted in G. Pugh, supra note 7, at 213.
16. State v. Sparacino, 164 La. 704, 114 So. 601 (1929). Wigmore states that such
an exception exists at common law even in the absence of an express statutory provision.
8 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2338 (McNaughton 4th ed. 1961)
[hereinafter Wigmore]. See also C. McCormick, On Evidence § 84, at 170 (3d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter McCormick].
17. La. R.S. 14:403(F), as amended by 1988 La. Acts No. 437, § I provides:
In any proceeding concerning the abuse or neglect or sexual abuse of a child
or the cause of such condition, evidence may not be excluded on any ground
of privilege, except in the case of communications between an attorney and his
client or between a priest, rabbi, duly ordained minister or Christian Science
practitioner and his communicant, as provided in Subsection B of this Section.
18. 489 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986). Another exception to the privilege is
found in La. R.S. 13:1676 (1983) (Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act).
19. The court found that the use of the wife's statement violated the discovery-notice
requirement. The admission of the husband's conversation with his wife was held to be
prejudicial error because without such admission it was the defendant's word against the
child's.
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for the state, the defendant has no right to prevent the witness from
doing so. Although the defendant may not exclude the witness's testithe
mony, he may exercise his right under section 461(1) to 2prevent
0
witness from referring to any confidential communications.
Under the jurisprudence, the state may not call a spouse as a witness
when it knows that the spouse will invoke the spousal privilege. This
particular rule stems from a broader one, namely, that it is improper
for any party to knowingly require a witness to invoke an evidentiary
privilege in the presence of the jury. 21 The American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice, on which this rule is based, provide that
counsel may not argue any inference from the failure of the other party
to call a witness if counsel knows that the failure is based on the
witness's claim of privilege. 22 Thus, as a general rule, it is improper to
comment on a defendant's assertion of any privilege. In keeping with
this general rule, the state supreme court has said that it is improper
for a prosecutor to comment on the defendant's assertion of a privilege
under section 461(l). 23
The witness's privilege, like all other evidentiary privileges, may be24
waived. Such a waiver occurs as long as the witness testifies voluntarily.
A trial court is under no duty to tell the spouse-witness about the
witness's privilege or even to determine that the witness is aware of the
privilege. It has been suggested that, upon request, the court should
advise the witness of the existence of the privilege, and this certainly
is permissible. 25 In an older case, the Louisiana Supreme Court had said
that it was not error for the prosecutor to ask a witness whether she
knew that she did not have to testify. 26 This decision has been criticized
and may have been implicitly overruled by the court when it formulated
27
the rule that it is inappropriate to comment on matters of privilege.

20. State v. Adams, 394 So. 2d 1204 (La. 1981) and cases cited therein.
21. State v. Day, 400 So. 2d 622 (La. 1981), discussed in Pugh & McClelland,
Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Evidence, 43 La. L. Rev. 413, 429 (1982); State
v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975).
22. See Prosecution Function 5.7(c) and Defense Function Standard 7.6(c) located in
The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Vol. I (2d ed. 1980).
23. State v. Day, 400 So. 2d 622 (La. 1981); State v. Bennett, 357 So. 2d 1136 (La.
1978).
24. State v. Ward, 483 So. 2d 578 (La. 1986).
25. Id. at 592 (Lemmon, J., concurring). See also Pugh & McClelland, Developments
in the Law, 1985-1986-Part I-Evidence, 47 La. L. Rev. 297, 300 (1986).
26. State v. Jacobs, 281 So. 2d 713 (La. 1973).
27. The Jacobs case was criticized in Pugh & McClelland, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Court for the 1973-1974 Term-Evidence, 35 La. L. Rev. 525, 542 (1975),
reprinted in G. Pugh, supra note 7.
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In saying that the issue of privilege is for the court, the supreme court
28
has indicated that it is not a matter for a jury.
The witness's privilege, it should be noted, does not prevent the
defendant from compelling his spouse to testify. On the contrary, the
29
defendant has a right to compel his spouse to testify as a witness.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:461(2) only gives the spouse-witness a right
to refuse to testify against the defendant. Where the defendant elects
not to call his spouse, may the prosecutor comment that the jury should
infer from this inaction that the testimony would have been unfavorable
to the defendant? In one case the court ruled that such a comment was
not inappropriate.30 It would seem that if the defendant who did not
call his spouse to the stand was merely exercising his privilege to exclude
private conversations, then the prosecutor's comment would violate the
rule announced by the supreme court to the effect that comments on
the invocation of a privilege are inappropriate.31 On the other hand, if
the wife was an eyewitness to the offense and neither spouse said anything
about the crime that would qualify as a private conversation, then the
older rule apparently could be applied without violating the defendant's
rights.
A divorce may or may not be significant in regard to the privilege.
Since divorce destroys the spousal relationship, the witness (former spouse)
would not be able to invoke the spouse-witness privilege under section
461(2). The privilege accorded private conversations under section 461(1)
should be unaffected by divorce, and conversations that occurred while
the parties were married should remain privileged. The section 461(1)
rule protects private conversations between spouses, and a divorce should
32
have no bearing in this regard.
THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE33

Civil Cases
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3734 establishes a broad privilege for

28. State v. Lee, 127 La. 1077, 54 So. 356 (1911). See also La. Code Evid. art.
104(A).
29. State v. Todd, 173 La. 23, 136 So. 76 (1931), discussed in Comment, Compulsory
Testimony of One Spouse in Behalf of the Other in Louisiana Criminal Trials, 6 Tul.
L. Rev. 489 (1931).
30. Todd, 173 La. 23, 136 So. 76.
31. State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975); State v. Day, 400 So. 2d 622 (La.
1981).
32. See Wigmore, supra note 16, at § 2341; McCormick, supra note 16, at § 85.
33. This privilege did not exist at common law but was created by statute. See Moosa
v. Abdalla, 178 So. 2d 273 (La. 1965).
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3' 4
communications between the patient and his "health care provider."

34. La. R.S. 13:3734 (Supp. 1988) provides:
A. As used in this Part:
(1) "Health care provider" means a hospital, as defined in Paragraph (3)
hereof, and means a person, corporation, facility, or institution licensed by the
state to provide health care or professional services as a physician, hospital,
dentist, registered or licensed practical nurse, pharmacist, optometrist, podiatrist,
chiropractor, physical therapist, psychologist, or licensed professional counselor
and an officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of
his employment.
(2) "Patient" means a natural person who receives health care from a licensed
health care provider.
(3) "Hospital" means any hospital as defined in R.S. 40:2102; any "Nursing
home" or "home" as defined in R.S. 40:2009.2; or any health care provider's
offices or clinics containing facilities for the examination, diagnosis, treatment
or care of human illness.
(4) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, tutor, curator, trustee, attorney
or other legal agent of the patient.
(5) "Communication" means the acquiring, recording or transmittal, of any
information, in any manner whatsoever, concerning any facts, opinions or statements necessary to enable the health care provider to diagnose, treat, prescribe
or to act for the patients; said communications may include, but are not limited
to any and all medical records, office records, hospital records, charts, correspondence, memoranda, laboratory tests and results, x-rays, photographs, financial statements, diagnoses and prognoses.
(6), (7) Repealed by Acts 1986, No. 496, § 2, eff. July 2, 1986.
B. Except as hereinafter provided, in civil cases, proceedings before a medical
review panel, pursuant to R.S. 40:1299.47 and in medical and dental arbitration
proceedings, pursuant to R.S. 9:4230-4236, and in proceedings and investigation
preliminary to all such actions, a patient or his authorized representative, has
a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent a health care provider from
disclosing any communication, whenever made, relating to any fact, statement
or opinion which was necessary to enable that health care provider or any other
health care provider to diagnose, treat, prescribe or act for the patient.
C. There shall be no privilege for any communication under this Section in
the following circumstances to the extent indicated:
(1) Either before or after probate, upon the contest of any will executed, or
claimed to have been executed, by such patient, or after the death of such
patient, in any action involving the validity of any instrument executed, or
claimed to have been executed by him, conveying or transferring any immovable
or movable property, any health care provider who has attended said patient
may disclose any communication regarding the patient which was necessary to
enable him to diagnose, treat, prescribe or to act for such deceased.
(2) After the death of the patient, the executor of his will, or the the
administrator of his estate, or the surviving spouse of the deceased, or if there
be no surviving spouse, the children of the deceased personally, or if minors,
by their representative, may give such consent, in any action or proceeding
brought to recover damages on account of the death of the patient, to permit
any health care provider who may have attended said patient at any time to
disclose any communication regarding said patient which was necessary to enable
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The term "health care provider" embraces not only natural persons,
but also corporations, facilities, or institutions licensed by the state to
provide health care or professional medical services. Further, the group
of natural persons to which the umbrella term "health care provider"
applies is not limited to physicians. That group includes, for example,
pharmacists, podiatrists, chiropractors, and physical therapists. Finally,
the term also extends to officers, employees, or agents of the entities
that are covered by the privilege.
Under this statute a patient or the patient's representative may refuse
to disclose and may prevent a health care provider from disclosing any
"communication" between himself and the provider, regardless of when
the communication was made. As defined in the statute, "communication" means the acquisition, recording, or transmission of any fact,
statement, or opinion that was necessary to enable any other health care

him to diagnose, treat, prescribe or act for such deceased.
(3) If any person brings an action to recover damages, in tort or for worker's
compensation under federal or state laws, for personal injuries, such action shall
be deemed to constitute a consent by the person bringing such action that any
health care provider who has attended such person at any time may disclose
any communication which was necessary to enable him to diagnose, treat,
prescribe, or act for said patient.
(4) The bringing of an action to recover for the death of a patient by the
executor of his will, or by the administrator of his estate, or by the surviving
spouse, or, if there be no surviving spouse, by the children personally, or, if
minors, by their representative, shall constitute a consent by such executor,
administrator, surviving spouse, or children or representative to the disclosure
of any communication by any health care provider who may have at any time.
attended said deceased.
(5) If any health care provider reasonably believes in good faith that any
legal proceeding enumerated in Paragraphs (3) or (4) under this Subsection has
or may be instituted for or on behalf of said patient, such health care provider
may disclose any communication acquired by him which was necessary to enable
him to diagnose, treat, prescribe, or act for said patient.
D. Any action or proceeding described in Subsection C of this Section which
constitutes a consent for a health care provider to testify at a trial on the merits
shall be deemed a consent for purposes of any discovery method authorized by
Articles 1421 et seq. of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
E. Nothing in this Section shall preclude the health care provider from disclosing
privileged information by medical report either before or after any legal proceedings are instituted, provided that he is in receipt of a written authorization
executed by the patient. Furthermore, when a patient is represented by an
attorney and that attorney provides the health care provider with written authorization executed by the patient, the health care provider may disclose to
the attorney any communication which was necessary to enable him to diagnose,
treat, prescribe, or act for the patient and may provide to the attorney, as agent
for the patient, any medical reports, x-rays, or any other written information
the health care provider has regarding the patient, all without the necessity of
complying with formal discovery.
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provider to "diagnose, treat, prescribe or to act for the patients." '35
This privilege applies, with a few notable exceptions, to all civil cases,
to proceedings before medical review panels, to medical and dental
arbitration proceedings, and to investigations preliminary to such proceedings. The proceedings excepted from the application of the privilege
fall into three categories:
1. Will contests and other actions brought after the death of
the patient involving the validity of an instrument that the patient
allegedly executed and that conveys or transfers property.
2. Actions brought after the death of the patient to recover
damages for the death of the patient. Under this exception certain
persons such as the executor, administrator, spouse, or children
of the decedent are authorized to give their consent to the
disclosure of communication. In such suits the defendant may
rely on this consent of the plaintiff in order to offer communications between patient and health care provider.
3. Personal injury actions, whether in tort or workers' compensation, brought by the patient. According to the statute, in
such cases the plaintiff impliedly consents to the disclosure of
communications.
In addition to these exceptions, the statute protects the health care
provider by allowing disclosure when the health care provider "in good
faith reasonably believes" that an action listed in exceptions 2 or 3
above, has been or will be brought.
Generally speaking, Louisiana courts have been reluctant to create
additional exceptions to the statute. 36 For example, in Vincent v. Lemaire37
the plaintiff, after obtaining a separation, brought suit for partition of
the community. The only asset available for distribution was $200,000
in cash, which the defendant had received in settlement of a personal
injury claim. In order to determine how much of that settlement was
community property, the court had to consider the extent of pain and
suffering that the husband endured before the marriage was dissolved.
The wife sought to depose the husband's psychiatrist, presumably to
gain information regarding the husband's mental suffering. The court,
however, rejected this attempt, stating that there was no exception for
this information under the privilege statute. The court refused the wife's
suggestion that it fashion a new exception analogous to the existing
statutory exception for personal injury actions brought by patients.

35. Id.
36. For another statutory exception, see La. R.S. 14:403(F), as amended by 1988
La. Acts No. 437, quoted at supra note 17. Compare State v. Bellard, 533 So. 2d 961
(La. 1988) with Matherne v. Hannan, 534 So. 2d 991 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
37. 370 So. 2d 190 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Paragraph D of section 3734 provides that when, in an action under
a listed exception, the patient is deemed to consent to disclosure at the
trial, the information may be disclosed during discovery. Under paragraph E, a patient's attorney may secure privileged information from
the health care provider if he provides the health care provider with
written authorization executed by the patient. The courts have not been
rigid in terms of the timing and method of disclosure. Generally, when
disclosure is authorized and the doctor can give the information by way
of a deposition or subsequently by testimony at trial, disclosure at other
times and by other means does not violate the privilege.3"
There have been several cases involving claims of improper disclosure. It has been held that a doctor does not violate the privilege by
discussing a patient's physical condition with lawyers defending against
a patient's suit to recover damages for personal injury. Although, technically, the doctor is authorized to disclose communications in a civil
proceeding or in a deposition, the fact that disclosure was made in a
conversation with lawyers involved in the case was held not to violate
the privilege. 9
While the statute provides for a release of information under each
of its exceptions, it does not authorize the release of the patient's entire
medical history. The information sought by the defendant must be
pertinent to the defense of the case. 40
The physician-patient privilege, like the spousal privilege, must be
timely asserted, and the failure to do so constitutes a waiver. The waiver
need not be express. It should be noted that while the privilege applies
in all civil proceedings, including interdiction proceedings, courts must
exercise care in attempting to show an implied waiver in these situations.
In one recent interdiction case, 4' the court held that the failure of the
patient's appointed counsel to object to the taking of the deposition of
the patient's doctors did not waive the physician-patient privilege. The
court further held that there was no waiver merely because the patient's
private attorney subsequently took the deposition of the patient's doctors.

42

Precisely what types of patient conduct give rise to an implied waiver
of the privilege is not clear. The courts, for example, have struggled
with the question of whether a waiver should be inferred when the
patient's pleadings in a particular case effectively put his physical or

38. Glenn v. Kerlin, 248 So.
(Supp. 1988).
39. Glenn, 248 So. 2d 834.
40. Williams v. Sistrunk, 417
365 So. 2d 4 (La. App. 4th Cir.
41. Interdiction of Haggerty,
42. Id.

2d 834 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971); La. R.S. 13:3734(D)

So. 2d 14 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Acosta v. Cary,
1978).
485 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
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mental condition in issue. In Arsenaux v. Arsenaux,4a the court left the
matter open. In that case, a wife sued for separation without fault, and
the husband reconvened for divorce claiming that the wife was at fault
in the breakup of the marriage. To support his claim the husband
wanted to show that the wife had had an abortion two years after he
had a vasectomy, an operation that would have made it impossible for
him to impregnate her. In a 4-3 decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that the wife's medical records were inadmissible under Revised
Statutes 13:3734. The court found initially that this action, the wife's
separation action, did not fall within any of the specifically enumerated
exceptions listed in the statute. Further, the court concluded that the
wife did not waive her privilege by filing for separation and claiming
that she was free from fault. Thus, the majority evidently rejected the
notion that a patient, merely by presenting some claim to which his
mental or physical condition at some time might be relevant, waives
the patient-provider privilege. The court's analysis of the problem, however, raises the question of whether the privilege would have been waived
if the wife's physical condition had been an element of her suit. Arguably, if the condition had been an element of the suit, the court
would have found that the evidence was not privileged. 44 The court did
allude to the woman's constitutional right to privacy, although the court
did not explain how that right is relevant to the issue of disclosure.
At first glance, Arsenaux appears to be inconsistent with the later
case of Dawes v. Dawes.4 5 In that case, the plaintiff filed a motion to
amend a joint custody decree. In the trial court, the plaintiff, the mother
of the child, successfully subpoenaed the father's prescription and hospital records from the DePaul and Ochsner Hospitals. On appeal, the
fourth circuit held that these materials were not protected by the patienthealth care provider privilege. The court pointed to amended Civil Code
article 146, which specifically provides that the mental and physical
health of the parties should be taken into account in formulating and
adjusting joint custody decrees. This case, then, is distinguishable from
the Arsenaux case. The Dawes holding rests upon the specific wording
of article 146; it does not stand for the broad proposition that in any
case in which a party's mental or physical condition is an issue, the
patient-health care provider privilege would not apply.

43. 428 So. 2d 427 (La. 1983), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, Developments in
the Law, 1982-1983-Evidence, 44 La. L. Rev. 335, 345 (1983) and Note, The Louisiana
Supreme Court and the Physician-Patient Privilege: Arsenaux v. Arsenaux, 44 La. L.
Rev. 1813 (1984).
44. In an earlier case, the court of appeal for the first circuit reached the same result
in a custody suit. Wing v. Wing, 393 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
45. 454 So. 2d 311 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
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Criminal Cases
The privilege for communications between physician and patient in
criminal cases is contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:476. In some
respects, this privilege is narrower than that which obtains in civil cases.
First, the privilege applies only to communications that are shared between the physician and the patient. Presumably the term "physician"
is much narrower than the term "health care provider," which appears
in the statute that creates the privilege for civil cases. As was noted
above, "health care provider" includes not only physicians but also
such entities as hospitals. Second, the statute that sets forth the privilege
for criminal cases refers to the "employment" of the physician, suggesting that the privilege applies only when a person seeks to use the
services of a physician. The protection afforded by the civil statute may
extend to situations in which the patient and health care provider have
no such direct relationship. Third, the criminal statute specifically provides that the physician-patient privilege does not apply to information
46
obtained through court-ordered examinations or diagnostic tests.
In some respects, however, the physician-patient privilege for criminal
cases may be broader than that for civil cases. For example, the privilege
for criminal cases is not limited to communications but applies to "any
information" that the physician may have obtained by reason of his
serving in that capacity. The privilege thus seems to cover information
obtained from persons other than the patient himself. Further, the
physician-patient privilege for criminal cases applies in all criminal proceedings .47 The statute creates no exceptions for certain cases as does
the statute that sets forth the civil privilege. As in civil cases, it is the
patient's privilege and not the doctor's.
In order for the physician-patient privilege to apply to the information at issue, that information must have been developed within the
context of a physician-patient relationship. This seems to suggest that
the doctor must have been consulted for the benefit of the defendant.
Where the doctor conducts an examination in order to benefit the state,
that is, to help support the state's case or to assure that the defendant
is competent to make a confession, the information uncovered by the

46. Although the subject is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that
there are possible self-incrimination problems when a court-ordered examination is conducted in violation of the defendant's right to counsel or without observance of the
warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). See State
v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982).
47. But see La. R.S. 403(F), as amended by 1988 La. Acts No. 437, and State v.
Bellard, 533 So. 2d 961 (La. 1988).
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doctor is not privileged.4 This rule holds regardless of 49whether the
defendant was in custody at the time of the examination.
Problems have arisen when the information developed within the
context of the physician-patient privilege is contained in a hospital record.
The supreme court, in one case, stated that the privilege created by
Revised Statutes 15:476 does not extend to hospital records that are
otherwise admissible under Revised Statues 13:3714. In reaching this
result the court concluded that the latter statute, by authorizing the
admission of hospital records, creates an exception to both the hearsay
rule and the physician-patient privilege, either of which might otherwise
serve to exclude such documents.50 In subsequent cases, however, the
supreme court has limited the rule of that decision. For example, the
court has held that even if hospital records are admissible under section
3714, testimony by a physician in lieu of the records is not.5 The court
has also stated that section 3714 does not apply to all medical records,
but only to hospital records. More recently, in State v. Carter,5 2 the
supreme court apparently rejected its earlier construction of section 3714.
In that case, the court stated that the hospital records rule was not
designed to permit the state to avoid the privilege "by including confidential privileged communications in otherwise admissible records." 53
At least one circuit court, however, has refused to follow Carter on
this point. In State v. Berluchaux,-A the first circuit concluded that the
supreme court's statement in Carter was dictum and therefore did not
bind lower courts. However, even under the interpretation of section
3714 proposed in Carter, the evidence at issue in Berluchaux would have
been admissible. According to Carter, communications that appear in
hospital records remain protected by the physician-patient privilege. The
record admitted in Berluchaux, which contained only the results of an
alcohol analysis performed on the defendant's blood, did not include
such confidential information.

48. State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975), discussed in Pugh & McClelland,
supra note 7, reprinted in G. Pugh, supra note 7, at 211.
49. Berry, 324 So. 2d at 828.
50. State v. O'Brien, 232 So. 2d 484 (La. 1970), discussed in Pugh, Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts, 1969-1970 Term-Evidence, 31 La. L. Rev. 381, 383 (1971),
reprinted in G. Pugh, supra note 5, at 171.
51. State v. Walker, 376 So. 2d 92 (La. 1979).
52. 383 So. 2d 357 (La. 1980).
53. There is an apparent conflict between La. R.S. 15:476 (1981) and La. R.S. 13:3714
(Supp. 1988). Section 3714 provides for the admissibility of hospital records, without
qualification. Section 476 provides for a privilege for confidential communications between
a patient and his physician, again without qualification. In Carter, the supreme court
attempted to reconcile the two statutes by stating that the hospital records hearsay exception
in section 3714 does not apply to statements in a hospital record that are privileged under
section 476.
54. 522 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
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Like other privileges, the physician-patient privilege for criminal cases
is waived if not asserted." Although the statute makes no such provision,
the Louisiana Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant impliedly waives
the physician-patient privilege when he makes his physical or mental
health an issue in the case.56 This waiver, however, only applies to
information that is relevant to the health issue and not to that which
is relevant to other issues in the case. In reaching this decision, the
court analogized Revised Statutes 15:476 to Revised Statutes 13:3734.
Because the latter statute applies to plaintiffs, not to defendants, one
may question the soundness of the court's analogy.
Where the defendant places his mental or physical health in issue
and offers expert testimony to support his position, the waiver doctrine
applies not only to information possessed by those physicians who testify
on his behalf, but also to any medical information, including that
obtained through prior medical examinations. The theory underlying this
rule is that the defendant should not be permitted to offer favorable
information regarding his physical or emotional condition and then to
cut the state off from access to unfavorable information on that same57
subject. This implied waiver theory was applied in State v. Aucoin
notwithstanding the fact that the doctor called by the state had been
engaged by the defendant to render professional services after the defendant was charged with the offense. The courts have suggested that
the trial court, before admitting evidence under the implied waiver theory,
should weigh the prejudicial effect of such evidence against its probative
value. 8 In performing this balancing analysis, the court should consider
these factors:
1. Would disclosure undermine the physician-patient relationship "by creating the widespread public impression that the
privilege is ineffectual"?
2. Would the evidence, by virtue of its possible relevance to
nonhealth issues, damage the defense?
3. Were the examination and the commission of the crime
remote from each other in time?
4. Might the evidence lead the jury to a guilty verdict by
creating the impression that the defendant is a bad or dangerous
person? 9
Whether the rule of Aucoin will be extended to a case in which the
psychiatrist is still treating the defendant at the time of trial is an open
question.

55.
56.
57,
58.
59.

State v. McCoy, 109 La. 682, 33 So. 730 (1903).
State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975).
362 So. 2d 503 (La. 1978).
Id. at 506.
Id.
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PRIVILEGE

Introduction
60
The attorney-client privilege applies in both civil and criminal cases.
The privilege enables the client not only to prevent his attorney from
disclosing privileged information, but also to shield himself from questions regarding what he told his attorney. If the client does not object
to the disclosure, he waives the privilege. The privilege may be impliedly
waived in some circumstances, as, for example, when a client testifies
regarding statements made by his attorney. Similarly, a client who injects
an alibi issue into the case, for example, by testifying in support of an
alibi defense, may thereby open the door to questioning regarding whether
he told his lawyer about the persons in whose company he claimed to
be at the time of the crime. 6' However, a disclosure by the attorney
without the client's consent does not constitute a waiver. The privilege
belongs to the client alone. 2 Such disclosure is improper because there
are circumstances when the client may not be in a position to assert
his privilege and his attorney is under a duty to assert the privilege on
63
the client's behalf.
Ordinarily, the privilege does not apply to the "fact of representation," that is, to the fact that the attorney has counseled or represented
the client. Consequently, an attorney may be compelled to reveal the
identity of his client.M Relying upon this rule, Louisiana courts have

60.

La. R.S. 15:475 (1981)

provides:

No legal advisor is permitted, whether during or after the termination of his
employment as such, unless with his client's express consent, to disclose any
communication made to him as such legal advisor by or on behalf of his client,
or any advice given by him to his client, or any information that he may have
gotten by reason of his being such legal advisor.
La. R.S. 13:3734.3 (Supp. 1988) provides:
No attorney or counselor at law shall give evidence of anything that has been
confided to him by his client, without the consent of such client; but his being
employed as a counselor or attorney does not disqualify him from being a
witness in the course in which he is employed.
See generally, Comment, Purpose and Extent of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Louisiana,

18 La. L. Rev. 162 (1957), reprinted in G. Pugh, supra note 5, at 155.
61. State v. Vassel, 285 So. 2d 221 (La. 1973). In Vassel, the objection to the question
came after it had been answered.
62. In this regard see State v. Maillian, 464 So. 2d 1071 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 469 So. 2d 982 (1985), where the defendant-wife was not allowed to claim the
victim-husband's attorney-client privilege. The husband's attorney was called by the state
to testify to facts about the spouses' legal separation in order to show motive.
63. State v. Morris, 259 La. 1001, 254 So. 2d 444 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
959, 92 S. Ct. 2066 (1972).
64. State v. Pike, 343 So. 2d 1388 (La. 1977).
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upheld the practice of calling the defendant's former attorney in a
habitual offender proceeding to prove that the defendant had been
previously convicted of a particular offense. 6 Requiring the attorney to
supply such information, however, seems to go far beyond merely requiring him to identify the client. Recently, courts and commentators
have begun to question whether this identification rule ought to be
66
absolute or ought to be subject to certain exceptions.
Civil Cases
In 1984, during the revision of the Civil Code and the rearrangement
of some of its sections, the legislature inadvertently repealed the article
that set forth the attorney-client privilege for civil cases, article 2283.
In 1986, the legislature corrected this oversight by enacting Louisiana
Revised Statutes 13:3734.3, a verbatim copy of former article 2283.67
In contrast to its criminal law counterpart, 68 this provision provides
that no attorney or counselor at law shall give evidence of anything
confided to him by the client. At first blush the privilege for civil cases
would seem to be somewhat narrower than that for criminal cases. First,
the civil privilege prohibits the giving of evidence rather than the making
of disclosures. Second, the civil privilege relates to things confided to
the attorney by the client, while the criminal privilege covers not only
client communications but also advice that the attorney renders to the
client and any information learned by the attorney during the course

65. State v. Bennett, 357 So. 2d 1136 (La. 1978); State v. Hayes, 324 So. 2d 421
(La. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 962, 96 S. Ct. 1747 (1976). See also La. R.S. 15:529.1(F)
(1981), which provides for the admissibility of certificates from the clerk of court or
warden as prima facie evidence of imprisonment or discharge of a person.
66. Recently, a great deal of attention has been focused on the case of Baltes v.
Doe, 44 Cr. L.R. 2079 (Nov. 2, 1988), Fla. Cir. Ct. 15th Judicial Circuit No. CL-88
1145-AD (Oct. 13, 1988), in which an attorney, whose client allegedly was involved in a
fatal hit and run accident, refused to disclose the identity of that client. Law enforcement
agencies were not able to discover the identity of the driver of the car. In a suit brought
by the family of the decedent, the plaintiffs attempted to compel the attorney to disclose
his client's name. Thus far, the Florida courts have refused to compel disclosure and
have respected the attorney's claim of privilege. In this case, if the attorney were to
identify the client, he would be saying much more than "This person is my client." He
would, in effect, be acknowledging that this person told him he was the driver of the
car that struck and killed the decedent. In this unusual context, the Florida courts have
indicated the usual rule does not apply. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings v. Jones,
517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings v. Pavlick, 663 F.2d 1057
(5th Cir. 1981).
67. La. R.S. 13:3734.3 (Supp. 1988), quoted at supra note 60. See also New Orleans
Saints v. Guesedieck, 615 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. La. 1985), aff'd, 740 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir.
1986).
68. The attorney-client privilege for criminal cases is contained in La. R.S. 15:475
(1981). See the discussion of this privilege at infra text accompanying notes 82-100.
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of representation. Because the disclosure of advice given by an attorney
to a client may directly or indirectly result in the revelation of confidences
given by the client to the attorney, one could argue that the civil privilege,
like its criminal analogue, ought to extend to such advice as well as to
the client communications themselves.
Like the criminal privilege, the civil privilege protects only those
communications that the client makes with an expectation of confidentiality. Thus, if an attorney receives a telephone call from his client
while a third person is present in his office, the privilege will not be
destroyed on that account. This is so because a client has a reasonable
expectation of privacy when placing a call to his attorney over the
telephone. 69 However, when an attorney sends a letter or a copy of a
letter that he originally sent to the client to an expert witness, the
information contained in that letter or copy is not a privileged communication, and the attorney-client privilege does not apply. 7°
It has been said in regard to the attorney-client privilege in criminal
cases that generally the identity of the client is not protected by the
privilege and disclosure can be compelled.' An interesting related question arose in a civil case whether the attorney can be compelled to
disclose the whereabouts of his client. 72 In Scaccia v. Lowe, 7 the wife
allegedly absconded with her child, thereby frustrating the husband's
visitation rights. After trying unsuccessfully to persuade the wife's attorney to divulge her location, the husband sued the attorney in tort.
The court concluded that the husband had no cause of action against
the attorney, but indicated in dictum that the husband might be able
to obtain some measure of relief by filing a rule to show cause in the
court that awarded custody. Although the court did not say so expressly,
it implied that that court might be able to compel disclosure.
The attorney-client privilege remains in effect after the attorneyclient relationship has ceased. In other words, any privileged information
that the attorney learns during the course of representation ordinarily
remains privileged after the relationship has ended. Some jurisdictions,
however, have recognized an exception to this rule for cases involving
the interpretation, implementation, or effectiveness of a deceased client's
testament. In some of these states the exception is absolute; discovery
of the client's communications to the attorney concerning the testament
is always permitted. Other states have drawn the exception more narrowly, disallowing discovery (that is, upholding the privilege) if the

69.
70.
71.
text.
72.
73.

Divincenti v. Redondo, 486 So. 2d 959 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
DeSalvo v. Rizza, 272 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
State v. Pike, 343 So. 2d 1388 (La. 1977). See supra note 64 and accompanying
There seems to be no comparable case on the criminal side.
445 So. 2d 1324 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
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person seeking disclosure takes a position adverse to the testamentary
dispositions. In an early case, the supreme court adopted this narrower
view.7 4 More recently, in Succession of Norton,7 the court reaffirmed
the exception in general, but declined to choose between the competing
versions. In that case, the parties seeking to overcome the privilege
wished to uphold and carry out the decedent's testamentary dispositions.
Consequently, the court found it unnecessary to determine whether discovery might be barred in those instances where the parties seeking
disclosure wish to break the testament.
Problems associated with the application of the attorney-client privilege in civil cases often arise during the discovery phase of an action.
One such problem, illustrated by the following scenario, is whether and
under what circumstances the privilege may be interposed as a bar to
discovery. The victim of a personal injury brings suit against the defendant, who promptly turns over the defense of the case to his insurer.
At the close of trial, the court enters a judgment against the insured
that exceeds the policy limits. The insured then sues his insurer, alleging
that the insurer improperly and negligently handled the case. In order
to build his case against the insurer, the insured seeks to discover the
file prepared by the lawyer during the first trial. The insured, however,
resists this demand on the ground that the file is protected by the
attorney-client privilege. When the lawyer prepared that file, he of course
represented both the insurer and the insured. Because that is so, neither
client should be able to claim the attorney-client privilege against the
other. When an attorney represents more than one client, he is obligated
to give requested information to both of them in the absence of any
agreement to the contrary; neither client can preclude the attorney from
disclosing information to the other.7 6 Thus, the rule is that when an
attorney represents several parties in a transaction, communications made
to him by one party generally are not privileged as to the other party
and, in a subsequent suit between the parties, either may discover the
77
other's communications with the attorney.
Another problem arising during the discovery process is the relationship between the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege. Information and materials which fall within the attorney-client
privilege are generally exempt from discovery. While the court may
determine that evidence is not protected by the attorney-client privilege,

74. Hart v. Thompson's Ex'r, 15 La. 88 (1840).
75. 351 So. 2d 107 (La. 1977).
76. Cousins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1972); Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
77. LeBlanc v. Broussard, 198 So. 2d 193 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Marcuse v.
Kramer, 5 Orl. App. 247 (La. App. 1908).
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the evidence may be protected by the work product privilege. Several
cases have turned on the distinction between the attorney-client privilege
and the work product privilege.78 The two, while not necessarily mutually
exclusive, are certainly not completely interdependent. There may be
circumstances in which the admission of certain evidence would violate
the work product rule but not the attorney-client privilege. The converse
is also true; evidence may be excludable under the attorney-client privilege
but yet not be classified as work product. For example, information
that the attorney simply receives from the client falls within the scope
of the attorney-client privilege; however, because the attorney has no
part in producing this information, it cannot be regarded as part of his
79
work product.
Notwithstanding the rules described above, it seems that the trial
court has considerably more flexibility in determining whether to apply
the civil law privilege than it has in determining whether to apply the
criminal law privilege, although the cases on this subject are few. The
courts have indicated that the trial court may refuse to honor a claim
of privilege when to do so would totally preclude the opposing party
from obtaining and introducing evidence that is critical to his case. In
one such case, the evidence that the defendant needed to establish his
claim was under court seal in federal court. The only way in which the
defendant could get access to the information was through documents
that were protected by the plaintiff's attorney-client privilege. The appellate court worked out an interesting solution to the problem. It
ordered the trial court to conduct an in-camera screening of the documents in the presence of counsel for both parties in order to determine
whether the information was privileged, and if so, whether the crimefraud exception applied.*80
Finally, it should be noted that when the attorney-client privilege is
applicable, as described above, it does not altogether disqualify counsel
from testifying as a witness; rather, it merely restricts the subjects about
which he may testify. However, when counsel is called upon to testify
in a case in which he represents one of the parties, substantial ethical
considerations may come into play.'

78. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Butler, 488 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
Work product is protected from discovery in Louisiana by Code Civ. P. art. 1424.
79. One question that Louisiana courts have not resolved is whether communications
made by company officials to in-house counsel are protected by the attorney-client privilege
in either the discovery phase or at the trial. In one recent case an appellate court declined
to state an'authoritative rule for those situations. W.L. Somner Co. v. Pacific-Atlantic
Oil, 522 So. 2d 1335 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988).
80. In re Kohn, 357 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
81. Sullivan v. Welch, 328 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Gutierrez v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
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Criminal Cases
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:475 provides that communications between a "legal advisor" and his client are privileged. By using the
unusual term "legal advisor," the legislature may have been attempting
to extend the privilege to communications made to persons other than
licensed lawyers.12 The statute also provides that the privilege remains
in effect beyond the period during which the attorney represents the
client. While the privilege applies after the relationship has terminated,
it includes only those communications and that information acquired by
counsel during the period of representation. It does not apply to communications and information acquired by counsel after representation
has been terminated. Further, the statute makes it clear that the privilege
applies not only to communications made by the client to the attorney,
but also to any advice given by the attorney to the client and to any
information that the attorney may have acquired by reason of being
the client's legal advisor.
The prerequisites for the application of the attorney-client privilege
were discussed at length in State v. Green.83 First, there must be an
attorney-client relationship, that is, the person asserting the privilege
must show that he sought and received the advice and assistance of an
attorney. Although the term "received" is usually included in defining
the attorney-client relationship, this reference is misleading. It is not
necessary that the attorney actually give any advice. For example, when
a prospective client discusses a case with an attorney for the purpose
of obtaining representation by that attorney, and the attorney nevertheless declines the case, their conversation falls within the scope of the
privilege. Consequently, it is more accurate to say that the critical factor
in determining whether an attorney-client relationship exists is whether
the advice sought is from a professional acting in that capacity.8 4 Under
this standard, if a person merely discusses a matter in the presence of
an attorney or even discusses the matter with the attorney himself, but
makes no effort to seek advice or otherwise to establish a professional
relationship with the attorney, then no attorney-client relationship arises.
Similarly, information given by one inmate to a fellow inmate who
works in the prison library is not within the privilege if the person who
conveys the information knows that the other person is an inmate and
5
not an attorney.1

82. For example, a lay person who holds himself out as being duly licensed to practice
law, but in fact is not, may arguably be within the term "legal advisor."
83. 493 So. 2d 1178 (La. 1986), noted in Note, A First Step Toward Resolution of
the Physical Evidence Dilemma: State v. Green, 48 La. L. Rev. 1019 (1988).
84. Id. at 1180-81.
85. State v. Spell, 399 So. 2d 551 (La. 1981), discussed in Pugh & McClelland, supra
note 21, at 431.
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The second prerequisite for the application of the privilege is that
the communication be given in confidence. In other words, the client
must make the disclosure with some reasonable expectation of confidentiality. Thus, disclosures made in the presence of third parties usually
are not privileged.1 6 However, if the third party is assisting counsel or
if the third party's presence is required for transmission of the information and the client reasonably expects that the information will remain
private, the privilege is not lost. State v. Montgomery"' demonstrates
the application of this principle. In that case the client, who had attempted to call her attorney, was connected with an answering service
that had been instructed to get the names of any callers as well as the
subject matter of the calls. According to the court, the client's statement
to the answering service that "I shot my husband" was privileged.
The third prerequisite is that the communication or information
given by the client and the advice given by the attorney be sufficiently
connected to the subject matter of the attorney's representation. The
test usually used is "whether the statement is made as part of the
purpose of the client to obtain advice on the subject."' s
The attorney-client privilege protects three categories of information.
First, it extends to communications made by or on behalf of the client.
These may be communicated to counsel orally, in writing, or in any
other form. Second, the privilege applies to advice given by counsel to
the client, that is, any recommendation regarding a decision or course
of conduct. Third, the privilege extends to all information that the
attorney has obtained in the course of representing the client. The statute
does not explicitly limit the sources from which or the manner in which
this information may be received. It is not the information per se that
is protected, but the attorney's acquisition of it. What this means is
that a party, through other sources, may prove the information in
question. The privilege only prevents the party from compelling the
client's attorney to disclose the information.
State v. Victores 9 provides an example of the kinds of "information"
that fall within the compass of the privilege. In that case a wife testifying
against her husband stated that she had not made a "deal" with the
state. The next day the wife's lawyer indicated to defense counsel that
there may have been such an agreement. According to the court of
appeal, the attorney-client privilege precluded the defendant from questioning the wife's lawyer about the deal. But the courts have not been
consistent in this regard. The court in Victores did not cite an earlier

86.
87.
88.
89.

State v. Wooley, 523 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
499 So. 2d 709 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986), writ denied, 502 So. 2d 106 (1987).
Green, 493 So. 2d at 1181 (quoted in Wooley, 523 So. 2d at 885).
486 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
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decision in which the state supreme court, confronted by a similar set
of facts, ruled that the defendant should be allowed to call a witness's
attorney in order to examine him about plea bargains between the witness
and the state. A plea bargain, the supreme court explained, is not
designed to be secret or confidential. Plea bargains are not made between
the attorney and client but between the client and the prosecutor. 9° This
analysis raises some doubt about what kinds of information learned in
the course of representation are within the scope of the privilege.
In another case illustrating the scope of information protected by
the privilege, a legal aide lawyer, who had attended a physical lineup
in which the defendant had participated, was called by the state to
testify regarding the circumstances surrounding the lineup. The lawyer
testified that he was routinely present at lineups in order to apprise
defendants of their constitutional rights, to consult with them should
they so desire, and to assure that the lineups were conducted fairly. He
admitted, however, that he was not the counsel of record for the
defendant in that case. After hearing this testimony, the trial court
permitted the lawyer to describe the lineup. On appeal, the supreme
court upheld the trial court's ruling, stating that the attorney merely
testified to his observations.- In a concurring opinion, however, one
justice noted with disapproval that the lawyer's testimony amounted to
a disclosure of information obtained during the course of representation
and therefore violated the attorney-client privilege. 9'
The attorney-client privilege is subject to several exceptions. State
v. Green92 listed and explained the most common exceptions. First, the
privilege does not apply when the client consents to the disclosure of
the information by his counsel. Second, there is an exception for those
situations in which disclosure is mandated by law or court order. 9a The
third exception, which is discussed more frequently in the jurisprudence
than any of the others, is the so-called crime-fraud exception. This
exception is applicable when the client seeks representation to further
criminal or fraudulent conduct, either past or future. In determining
whether this exception applies, the court must focus on the client's intent
and action: what did the client seek to achieve by retaining the services
of counsel? When a client acts in order to promote or further some
criminal or fraudulent enterprise and the attorney undertakes representation innocently, the privilege does not apply. Conversely, if a client

90. State v. Rankin, 465 So. 2d 679 (La. 1985).
91. State v. Jones, 284 So. 2d 570 (La. 1973) (Barham, J., concurring).
92. 493 So. 2d 1198 (La. 1986).
93. See, e.g., In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.); aff'd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th
Cir. 1967); In re Price, 429 N.E.2d 961 (Ind. 1982); In re Shamey, 73 N.J. 187, 313
A.2d 655 (1977); In re Kerr, 86 Wash. 2d 655, 548 P.2d 297 (1976); A.B.A. Informal
Opinion 1057 (Aug. 12, 1968).
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seeks legal services for perfectly innocent or legitimate reasons, the
wrongful acts of his attorney will not abrogate the privilege. The application of these principles was illustrated in a recent case in which
the attorney and client conspired to obstruct justice by hiding evidence
of the crime, namely, the gun used to perpetrate the crime. According
to the court, the information that the attorney received from the client,
including the location of the gun, was not within the attorney-client
privilege. 94
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that it is improper for a
party to call a witness when that party knows that either the witness
or the defendant will claim the attorney-client privilege. 95 A corollary
of this rule is that the state may not comment on a defendant's claim
of privilege.
At times the application of the attorney-client privilege is complicated
by other problems in criminal procedure. For example, the conflict-ofinterest problem is not insubstantial. The following simple hypothetical
demonstrates the problem and its potential effect on the attorney-client
privilege. Two clients, A and B, are jointly represented by one lawyer.
Client A tells counsel something that is harmful to his, A's, position
but that is beneficial to his co-defendant's, B's, position. For example,
A may tell his lawyer that he was the one who fired the fatal shot, or
that B did not want to commit the crime but A did. The attorney is
then caught in a conflict. Although it might seem that neither client
could have a reasonable expectation that his communications would be
kept secret from the other in a case of joint representation, the ethical
rules that govern attorney conduct mandate a different conclusion. Under
those rules, the attorney has a duty to respect A's confidence; however,
he also has a duty to do his best for B. State v. Carmouche96 discusses
the problem of conflicts. Although not providing substantial guidance
to counsel in these situations, the supreme court said that the judge
should require an attorney to disclose the basis for conflict.
Appellate courts scrutinize conflict situations with care. For example,
in one case, the court said that the lack of effective cross-examination
of a witness who was also represented by counsel for the defendant
demonstrated the conflict. Since there was no showing of a waiver of
the right to conflict-free representation, this was held to be reversible
error. 97 Counsel has an obligation to advise his client of any potential
conflict-of-interest and to give the client the opportunity to decide whether

94. State v. Taylor, 502 So. 2d 537 (La. 1987), concurring and dissenting opinions,
502 So. 2d 1389.
95. State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La. 1975).
96. 508 So. 2d 792 (La. 1987).
97. State v. Ross, 410 So. 2d 1388 (La. 1982).
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to allow counsel to represent him or to employ a new attorney. In the
former case, the client must necessarily agree to disclose all information
to those whom the attorney jointly represents. In other words, the price
to the client of continued representation by the attorney is, in a sense,
the waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
In another case, one that presented a rather unusual conflict-ofinterest problem, the defense attorney had worked for the victim of the
crime before her death. In an effort to establish a motive for the crime,
the prosecutor sought to question the attorney regarding the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the victim's will, which named the
defendant as a legatee. At a hearing to recuse the attorney, the attorney
testified that, in his opinion, his testimony would not "harm" his client.
Although the test for determining the propriety of disclosing attorneyclient communications is not whether doing so will harm the client, the
trial court found that the testimony did not run afoul of the privilege
and the court of appeal agreed. The result reached by the courts is
probably correct. Because the attorney learned of the information as a
result of providing services for the testatrix and not as a result of
representing the defendant, that information was not within the attorneyclient privilege. The appellate court, however, did not rest its decision
upon that rationale. According to the court, the defendant, by choosing
the testatrix's lawyer to represent her, waived her privilege.9" Although
this result might be justified under the facts of the case, it would seem
that counsel should have advised the defendant that he might be called
as a witness for the state.
Finally, in another recent conflict-of-interest case, the attorney represented codefendants A and B at their arraignment. A subsequently
pleaded guilty. At B's trial, the court permitted the attorney to ask A,
who was appearing as a witness for the state, not only about what A
stated at arraignment but also about prior inconsistent statements that
A had made to the attorney during the course of his representation of
A. The court of appeal, reasoning that the benefit of this testimony to
B outweighed any harm that A might have suffered through the violation
of his privilege, upheld the admission of this evidence. 99
Lurking in the background of these recent conflict-of-interest cases
is the problem of squaring the attorney-client privilege with the sixth
amendment rights of confrontation and compulsory process. The issue
in these cases, strictly speaking, is not whether the information is within

98. State v. Lambertus, 482 So. 2d 812 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
99. State v. Solid, 529 So. 2d 108 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988). In this case the attorney
himself wanted to testify on behalf of his client as to statements made by A to him, but
knowing that this would put his client and himself in an awkward position he moved
for a mistrial. The court declined the mistrial, and this was held to be no error because
the attorney's testimony was merely cumulative.
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the scope of the attorney-client privilege. The real question is whether
the privilege of one defendant-client must yield to the confrontation and
compulsory process rights of another defendant-client. In this regard,
one must remember that the rights of confrontation and compulsory
process are of constitutional dimension, while privileges such as the
attorney-client privilege are either products of the common law or creatures of the legislature.' °0 Consequently, when the recognition of the
privilege in a particular case would deny a criminal defendant either
the right to confront the witnesses against him or the right to subpoena
witnesses in his behalf, the interest of the party who is asserting the
privilege should have to yield to the interests of the defendant.
CONCLUSION

This article has reviewed the current state of Louisiana law on the
three most important general evidentiary privileges: husband-wife, physician-patient, and attorney-client. While many issues arising under these
privileges have been settled by the courts, there are still areas of uncertainty that require legislative action. The Louisiana State Law Institute
is working on the subject of evidentiary privileges to be included in the
Code of Evidence as Chapter 5. During this revision process, the Institute
will examine the law of other jurisdictions as an aid in drafting the
Louisiana privilege rules. The law of other jurisdictions, while helpful
to the revision process, may also be of some benefit to practitioners
for comparative purposes in the interim. Thus, as a postscript to this
article, the authors have included a short comparison of the Uniform
Rules and the Proposed Federal Rules on privileges.
POSTSCRIPT

The Louisiana State Law Institute, in preparing the Louisiana Evidence Code, made reference to the Federal Rules of Evidence as one
of its principal points of departure. 0 1 The Federal Rules of Evidence
as they were originally proposed by the Advisory Committee contained
a set of rules covering the various evidentiary privileges.' 02 These rules,
while to some extent representing a codification of existing law, did
introduce several significant changes. When the rules were sent to Congress they were substantially amended after considerable debate. Only
one significant substantive rule survived, rule 501. This rule provides

100. La. Const. of 1974, art. 1, §§ 13, 16; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974).
101. La. Code Evid. art. 101 comment (a).
102. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (March 1971).
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essentially that the federal courts should continue to apply the common
law, except that in cases where state substantive law applies, such as
diversity cases, the courts should apply the evidentiary privileges under
the law of the applicable state.10 3 Thus the Federal Rules, as they
currently exist, do not represent a significant departure with the past
and may not be particularly helpful in preparing evidence articles for
inclusion in the Louisiana Code of Evidence. The Federal Rules as they
were proposed, however, represented a somewhat different approach to
the law of privileges than had been manifested in the past. Rule 501,
as originally drafted, provided that no one had a privilege to refuse to
be a witness except to the extent provided in the Constitution or by
specific act of Congress or as provided in the Rules of Evidence or
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.' °4 This general introductory
rule set the stage for what was a rather restrictive and narrow approach
to the law of privileges. For one thing, it did away with the common
law of privileges and with the power of courts to create or expand
privileges. Also, by stating a bold rule in the negative, that is, no one
may refuse to be a witness or refuse to testify, the rules indicated that
the law of privileges should be held within a very limited scope.
This restrictive approach to privileges can be found in the Proposed
Federal Rules that deal with the spousal privilege and the physicianpatient privilege. Proposed Federal Rule 505105 sets forth the husband-

103.

Fed. R. Evid. 501, as adopted by Congress, provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
104. The Supreme Court rule as submitted to Congress provided:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress, and except as provided in these rules or in other
rules adopted by the Supreme Court, no person has a privilege to:
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or
producing any object or writing.
105. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505 provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE OF PRIVILEGE. An accused in a criminal proceeding
has a privilege to prevent his spouse from testifying against him.
(b) WHO MAY CLAIM THE PRIVILEGE. The privilege may be claimed by
the accused or by the spouse on his behalf. The authority of the spouse to do
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wife privilege. The privilege, which either the defendant or the spouse
can invoke, prevents the spouse from testifying against the defendant.
The rule, however, does not recognize a private communications privilege. Furthermore, like the rules in a number of states, the proposed
rule contains two important exceptions: The privilege does not apply
(1) when the defendant stands accused of a crime against his spouse or
a child, or (2) when the spouse is questioned regarding matters that
occurred before the marriage.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1974), were modeled
on the Proposed Federal Rules before their revision by Congress. The
Uniform Rules contain a spousal privilege somewhat broader than that
contained in Proposed Federal Rule 505. Uniform Rule 504, in its present
form, establishes a privilege for confidential communications, one that
either spouse may claim. However, several proposed changes to the rule
would make it similar to the present law in Louisiana. Under these
proposals not only would confidential communications be privileged,
there would also be-a witness's privilege that would enable the spouse
to refuse to testify on any matter. Like the proposed Federal Rule, the
Uniform Rule creates an exception to the privilege in cases involving
crimes against spouses or children. This aspect of the rule would not
be changed by the proposed revisions.
Likewise, Proposed Federal Rule 504 creates a privilege for communications between medical personnel and their patients.' °6 As much

so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(c) EXCEPTIONS. There is no privilege under this rule (1) in proceedings in
which one spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of a
third person committed in the course of committing a crime against the other,
or (2) as to matters' occurring prior to marriage, or (3) in proceedings in which
a spouse is charged with importing an alien for prostitution or other immoral
purpose in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1328, with transporting a female in interstate
commerce for immoral purposes or other offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
2421-2424, or with a violation of other similar statutes.
106. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504 provides:
(a) Definitions.
(1) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a
psychotherapist.
(2) A "psychotherapist" is (A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any
state or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while engaged
in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including
drug addiction, or (B) a person licensed or certified as a psychologist under
the laws of any state or nation, while similarly engaged.
(3) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than those present to further the interest of the patient in the
consultation, examination, or interview, or persons reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the communication, or persons who are participating in the
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as any of the other Proposed Federal Rules, this one shows that the
drafters of the Federal Rules preferred a narrow and restrictive approach
to privileges. Under the proposed rule, there is no general physicianpatient privilege. Rather, the privilege accorded by the rule applies only
when the physician is a "psychotherapist" and extends only to communications that are made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment
of a mental or emotional condition. The scope of this privilege is further
limited by several critical exceptions. First, the privilege does not apply
where the patient relies on a mental or emotional condition as an element
of his claim. Second, in proceedings to hospitalize a patient for mental
illness, the privilege does not extend to any communications relevant to
an issue in the case if the doctor determines that the patient is in need
of such hospitalization.
The Uniform Rule of Evidence is somewhat similar to the proposed
federal rule.'°7 However, in an effort to provide a model which is broader

diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including
members of the patient's family.
(b) General rule of privilege.-A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications,
made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional
condition, including drug addiction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or
persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction
of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
(c) Who may claim the privilege.-The Privilege may be claimed by the patient,
by his guardian or conservator, or by the person representative of a deceased
patient. The person who was the psychotherapist may claim the privilege but
only on behalf of the patient. His authority so to do is presumed in the absence
of evidence to the contrary.
(d) Exceptions.
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization.-There is no privilege under this rule for
communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient
for mental illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment
has determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization.
(2) Examination by order of the judge.-If the judge orders an examination of
the mental or emotional condition of the patient, communications made in the
course thereof are not privileged under this rule with respect to the particular
purpose for which the examination is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise.
(3) Condition on element of claim or defense.-There is no privilege under this
rule as to communications relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition
as an element of his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any
proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of his
claim or defense.
107. Uniform R. Evid. 503(b) (1974) provides:
General rule of privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made
for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his [physical,] mental or emotional
condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, among himself, his [physician
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than the Proposed Federal Rule discussed above, the drafters of the
rule set forth two alternative formulations for the class of medical
professionals to which the privilege applies-"physician" and "psychotherapist." They also created an option regarding the types of medical
conditions covered by the privilege-mental and emotional only or physical as well as mental and emotional. Thus, under one version of the
uniform rule, the privilege extends to any communications made by or
to any physician for the purpose of diagnosing or treating any medical

condition, not just mental and emotional conditions. Most states that
have adopted the uniform rule have chosen this version, that is, have
selected the broader class of "physician" and have not restricted the
privilege to situations involving diagnosis or treatment of mental or
10
emotional conditions.°
In contrast to the spousal and physician-patient privileges, proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 503,10 9 which deals with the attorney-client

or] psychotherapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or
treatment under the direction of the [physician or] psychotherapist, and persons
who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the
[physician or] psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
108. See J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 2 Weinstein's Evidence 504[08], at 504-31 (1988).
109. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 provides:
(a) Definitions.-As used in this rule:
(1) A "client" is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other
organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional
legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional legal services from him.
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the cli nt to
1
be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation.
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the lawyer in
the rendition of professional legal services.
(4) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third
persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition
of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the communication.
(b) General rule of privilege.-A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the
client, (1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's
representative, or (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer's representative, or (3)
by him or his lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common
interest, or (4) between representatives of the client or between the client and
a representative of the client, or (5) between lawyers representing the client.
(c) Who may claim the privilege.-The privilege may be claimed by the client,
his guardian or, conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or
the successor, trustee, a similar representative of a corporation, association, or
other organization, whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer
at the time of the communication may claim the privilege but only on behalf
of the client. His authority to do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to
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privilege, is similar in many respects to current Louisiana law. The
Federal Rule, however, is clearer and more comprehensive in some
respects. For example, that rule expressly extends the privilege not only
to clients and their lawyers, but also to the representatives of those
persons. The rule also clearly provides that the privilege may be claimed
either by the client or by the lawyer on behalf of his client. Like current
Louisiana law, the proposed federal rule contains several exceptions.
These exceptions include the crime-fraud situation, claims based on a
breach of duty either by lawyer or client, matters involving persons who
are claimants through the same deceased client, situations in which a
document has been attested by the attorney, and situations involving
representation of joint clients.

the contrary.
(d) Exceptions.-There is no privilege under this rule:
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud.-If the services of the lawyer were sought
or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the
client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud; or
(2) Claimants through same deceased client.-As to a communication relevant
to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, regardless
of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos
transaction; or
(3) Breach of duty by lawyer or client.-As to a communication relevant to an
issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer;
or
(4) Document attested by lawyer.-As to a communication relevant to an issue
concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or
(5) Joint clients.-As to a communication relevant to a matter of common
interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any
of them to a lawyer retained' or consulted in common, when offered in an
action between any of the clients.

